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INTRODUCTION
Philosophical aesthetics (hereafter ‘aesthetics’) isthe branch of philosophy which explores issues
having to do with art, beauty, and related phenom-
ena. Philosophers have often been skeptical about the
place of empirical investigation in aesthetics.1–3
However, in recent years many aestheticians have
turned to cognitive science to enrich their under-
standing of their subject matter. This is linked to a
broader ‘naturalistic’ turn in philosophy in which the
connections, rather than the differences, between
philosophical and scientiﬁc investigation are
emphasized. Cognitive scientists have, in turn, been
inspired by work in aesthetics.
We explore a representative subset of the areas
in which aestheticians have interacted with work in
the cognitive sciences. We start with some general
topics in aesthetics—the deﬁnition of art and the epi-
stemic status of aesthetic judgments. We then move
on to discussing research concerning the roles that
two central human capacities—imagination and
perception—play in our engagement with works of
art. We conclude with a discussion of developments
in the burgeoning ﬁeld of experimental philosophical
aesthetics.
COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND THE
DEFINITION OF ART
What is art? Philosophers often attempt to answer
this question by offering deﬁnitions of art. Needless
to say, though, there is no consensus as to what the
correct deﬁnition is (indeed, some philosophers
argue that art is impossible to deﬁne). Debates about
these issues have been central to contemporary aes-
thetics. In this section, we examine points of actual
and potential interaction between aesthetics and cog-
nitive sciences in these deﬁnitional debates.
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From Cognitive Science to Deﬁnitions of Art
The origins of the contemporary debate about the
deﬁnition of art can be traced back to Weitz’s ‘The
Role of Theory in Aesthetics,’ where he argues that it
is logically impossible to provide necessary and sufﬁ-
cient conditions for the category of art because it has
an ‘expansive, adventurous character’ (Ref 4, p. 32).
Weitz’s arguments faced many objections (for discus-
sion, see Davies5), and the idea that the very nature
of art prohibits its deﬁnition did not generally take
root. However, Dean6 offers a defense of Weitz’s cen-
tral claim which relies on psychological work on the
nature of concepts. Dean argues that proposed deﬁni-
tions of art are misguided, given that they presuppose
the correctness of the classical theory of concepts
(i.e., the view that necessary and sufﬁcient conditions
underlie our classiﬁcatory practice). The classical the-
ory of concepts has, however, been rejected by cogni-
tive scientists.7,8 Hence, Dean (Ref 6, p. 34) argues,
deﬁnitions of art are doomed to failure.
Other philosophers have used methods and
insights from the cognitive sciences to test existing
deﬁnitions of art or to formulate new ones. Kamber9
surveyed people’s intuitions regarding which items
are art and which are not, to test the adequacy of
existing deﬁnitions of art. He argued that his surveys
show that extant deﬁnitions of art do not successfully
track folk intuitions or the judgments of art experts.
Of particular interest were folk and expert responses
to artifacts that are rarely even discussed by philoso-
phers of art such as Bugatti cars and canal bridges. A
total of 53% of all subjects in one study (as well as
46% of art professionals) identiﬁed a contemporary
Bugatti Veyron as an artwork! Pignocchi10 went fur-
ther and used psychological ﬁndings regarding con-
cept learning to formulate a novel deﬁnition, or, in
his words, ‘characterization’ of the concept of art. It
states that ‘an agent intuitively uses the concept of
art to categorize an artifact if an only if she infers
that this artifact has been intended to fulﬁll a func-
tion or set of functions which she has already
accepted as a function or set of functions that can be
fulﬁlled by artifacts that she considers as typical art’
(Ref 10, p. 429). His characterization is a hypothesis
about the psychological mechanisms underlying peo-
ple’s intuitive categorization of something as art,
based on ﬁndings of cognitive scientists11,12 regard-
ing the inﬂuence of intended functions on people’s
intuitions about how to categorize an artifact.
Pignocchi (Ref 10, p. 429) rightly acknowledges that
his characterization is merely a ﬁrst step in the philo-
sophical project of deﬁning art, as philosophical deﬁ-
nitions often aim not just to reﬂect how a concept is
used but to show how the concept should be used.
Pignocchi himself has very little to say about what
cognitive science can contribute to such normative
deﬁnitions. Still, any such normative project starts off
with a descriptive step: one needs to know how con-
cepts function before revising their functioning.
From Deﬁnitions of Art to Cognitive Science
Part of Pignocchi’s project is to argue that empirical
work on folk intuitions about art might beneﬁt from
attention to philosophical work on the deﬁnition of
art (Ref 10, p. 425–427). Philosophical deﬁnitions
are potentially relevant for cognitive scientists work-
ing on other aesthetic issues, given that the way in
which scientists themselves employ art concepts has
an immediate impact on their results. As Seghers13
points out, the aesthetic ﬁtness indicator hypothesis,
which proposes that art-making evolved through sex-
ual selection as a signaling trait of males, ‘is heavily
dependent on a particular conception of art,’ namely
a conception that involves a strong bias toward
males in artistic production (Ref 13, p. 240–241).
Davies14 likewise maintains that scientists often start
from inadequate characterizations of art. More spe-
ciﬁcally, he argues that many scientists15–17 make
their concepts of art overly inclusive, such that they
would, for example, class ‘crude doodlings and
clumsy grafﬁti’ (Ref 14, p. 28) as visual art. These
overly inclusive concepts, Davies argues, have ‘the
result that claims for connections between art and
humans’ evolved behavior become trivially true’ (Ref
14, p. 28). Similar worries arise with respect to other
art concepts, such as the concept of poetry. In order
to investigate poetry empirically, it has to be decided
which items are going to count as poetry in these
investigations. In Hanauer’s18 work on the genre-
speciﬁc hypothesis of reading, for example, the
poems are drawn from introductory poetry courses.
It might be considered a beneﬁt that such works are
paradigmatic cases of poetry. However, it is possible
that including less familiar (or more contested) forms
of poetry in such empirical studies would lead to dif-
ferent results. In summary, any cognitive scientist
working on art appreciation or art creation needs to
make explicit the criteria for inclusion in her studies.
Philosophers, on their side, can design deﬁnitions of
art or other art categories with such work in mind.
AESTHETIC EPISTEMOLOGY AND
COGNITIVE SCIENCE
In this section, we focus on efforts to evaluate the
epistemic status of aesthetic judgments. We begin by
considering a number of skeptical worries which
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work in cognitive science generates concerning such
judgments. These are worries which seem to suggest
that we have far less aesthetic knowledge than is typi-
cally supposed. We then outline some responses
which have been offered to these charges before sur-
veying some further claims which have been made
concerning the relationship between cognitive science
and aesthetic epistemology. Before proceeding,
though, it’s worth brieﬂy considering one form of
skepticism which we won’t be addressing here. There
is a common view which maintains that the very
notion of ‘aesthetic knowledge’ is problematic since
there is no genuine right or wrong when it comes to
aesthetic matters. For example, according to one
interpretation of the famous dictum that there is ‘no
disputing about taste’ those who make aesthetic
claims only judge what they themselves like or what
is good (or beautiful, etc.) ‘for them’ rather than
making judgments about some objective, or intersub-
jective, truth regarding aesthetic matters. We will
not, however, focus on skepticism of this kind here
for two reasons. First, most of those engaged in phil-
osophical aesthetics presuppose that (at least with
respect to certain debates) there really is aesthetic
truth to be had. Second, there is an important sense
in which the kinds of skepticism we address below
run deeper than these concerns about objectivity in
aesthetics. To put things colloquially, the worries we
consider raise problems not only for those who claim
to know about art but also from those who claim to
know what they like (or at least to know why they
like it).
Skeptical Worries about Aesthetic Judgment
Work done in aesthetics often presupposes that cer-
tain people are able to reliably judge the aesthetic
properties which artworks (and other objects) pos-
sess. That is, very roughly, that they tend to arrive at
true beliefs about these matters more often than not.
This is not to say that the ability to do so is universal
or even particularly widespread. Still, it is typically
presupposed that there are some individuals who are
able to judge reliably of aesthetic matters and whose
judgments routinely constitute knowledge. So, how
might the deliverances of cognitive science challenge
this view?
One common worry is that empirical work has
highlighted a number of ways in which our aesthetic
judgments are strongly inﬂuenced by aesthetically
irrelevant factors. In this section, we consider three
representative examples; mere exposure, ordering
effects, and social factors (such as race and gender).
The classic studies concerning mere exposure in
aesthetics were conducted by Cutting19 who reported
that mere exposure (i.e., the unreinforced exposure
to a stimulus) was enough to signiﬁcantly increase
preference for particular impressionist paintings over
others. Cutting concluded that the mechanism of
mere exposure likely plays a signiﬁcant role in the
formation and maintenance of artistic canons (Ref
19, p. 335).
In terms of ordering effects, a plethora of stud-
ies have shown that ‘[w]henever competing options
are considered in sequence, their evaluations may be
affected by order of appearance’ (Ref 20, p. 245).
And, with respect to aesthetic judgments in particu-
lar, studies have shown that ordering effects can have
a profound effect on our judgments of performances
in areas as diverse as classical music21 and ﬁgure
skating,20 with, for example, performances which
appear ﬁrst typically being viewed more favorably
than those in a middle position.
Finally, irrelevant social factors have repeatedly
been shown to inﬂuence our aesthetic judgments. To
use one famous example, many orchestras have
recently introduced screens in their auditions to pre-
vent the gender of the performer from being known
to the judging panel. Such procedures are often moti-
vated by the concern that a lack of anonymity might
disadvantage women during the audition process.
This worry appears to be justiﬁed. A series of studies
by Goldin and Rouse, for example, showed that ‘the
screen increases—by 50 percent—the probability that
a woman will be advanced from certain preliminary
rounds and increases by severalfold the likelihood
that a woman will be selected in the ﬁnal round’ (Ref
22, p. 738).
The underlying worry, then, is that a plethora
of such irrelevant factors frequently affect our aes-
thetic judgments rendering many of them unreliable
and, therefore, unwarranted.
Responding to Skeptical Worries
So, how might antiskeptics respond to these worries?
One line of response involves denying that these
experiments really target aesthetic judgments of the
appropriate kind. Aestheticians typically focus on a
range of different properties which fall under the
label ‘aesthetic’ (beauty, elegance, vibrancy, etc.). By
contrast, much of the experimental work we have
discussed above focuses on simple judgments of pref-
erence or liking. As such, some might object that phi-
losophers and cognitive scientists are merely talking
past each other. To some extent this is correct. Mere
judgments of liking are typically not of much interest
within aesthetics because aestheticians tend to hold
WIREs Cognitive Science Aesthetics and cognitive science
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that aesthetic judgments have a normative dimension
and it is widely held that ‘while some normative
notions may be explainable in terms of others, we
cannot express normative notions in non-normative
terms.’23 However, it is not clear that this helps the
anti-skeptic concerning aesthetic judgment. The mere
exposure effect, for example, has consistently been
shown to arise with respect to a range of measures
including normative measures of goodness.24 And,
more generally, there is no evidence to suggest that
there will be any signiﬁcant difference between
results concerning judgments of liking and those con-
cerning judgments of other kinds.
A second antiskeptical strategy argues that
these distorting factors, while genuine, are not signiﬁ-
cant enough to make our aesthetic judgments system-
atically unreliable. After all, the claim that our
judgments with respect to aesthetic matters are, by
and large, reliable is consistent with their sometimes
being distorted in problematic ways. However, many
of those who discuss such distorting factors take
them to be ubiquitous in a way which is difﬁcult to
reconcile with any claims of general reliability.
Indeed, Cutting (ref 19, p. 335) goes so far as to
make the striking suggestion that judgments of artis-
tic quality may be driven entirely by the mere expo-
sure effect. Interestingly, though, some philosophers
have recently argued (as we will see below) that such
effects may not be as insensitive to the quality of the
works themselves as Cutting suggests.
A third line of response is to argue that, while
these distorting factors have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on
the judgments of laypeople, they do not undermine
the judgments of experts. As such, these experimental
results are compatible with a traditional view accord-
ing to which reliable aesthetic judgment is the pur-
view of a few true judges (Ref 25, p. 263). Such a
view is supported by a study on ordering effects in
music contests by Haan et al. which found that
‘experts are unambiguously better judges of quality,
at least in the sense that the outcome of contests
judged by experts are less sensitive to’ (Ref 26, p. 72)
such effects, and a number of other studies27 have
reached similar conclusions with respect to other dis-
torting factors. However, the news is not entirely
positive for the expertise defense. First, a distorting
factor’s having less inﬂuence is importantly distinct
from its having no inﬂuence and all of the studies
mentioned still show that these factors have some
effect on the judgments of experts. Worse still, other
studies have found that experts perform no better
than laypeople with respect to some distorting fac-
tors, and still others that in some respects their per-
formance is actually worse.28
A ﬁnal line of response involves accepting that
these distorting factors are genuine, and genuinely
problematic, but taking efforts to mitigate their
effects. In some cases this seems to be a relatively
straightforward matter (consider again the orchestra
auditions discussed above). In other cases, though, it
is not entirely clear how best to counter such effects.
Indeed, some prima facie plausible suggestions for
doing so actually tend to make matters worse. For
example, various studies29 have shown that encour-
aging subjects to support their aesthetic judgments
with clearly articulated reasons can actually reduce
their reliability. Still, some philosophers have sug-
gested methods for eliminating or mitigating distort-
ing factors. Sherri Irvin30 for example, argues that
there is some reason to believe that certain mindful-
ness techniques might lessen their epistemic impact.
Other Epistemic Issues
Although the primary focus of philosophical discus-
sion has been the kind of skeptical worry discussed
above, this is not the only area where empirical
results might be important for aesthetic epistemol-
ogy. Lopes,31 for example, has recently argued that
work in cognitive science undermines two further
claims which are fundamental to much work in aes-
thetics. First, he highlights that work by, for exam-
ple, Nisbett and Wilson32 undermines the popular
view that we, by and large, have reliable introspec-
tive aspect to the reasons behind our aesthetic judg-
ments. Second, he highlights that attempts to
introspect and articulate the reasons for our aesthetic
judgments can have ‘a systematically distorting effect
on our attitudes’ (Ref 31, p. 33). Both claims appear
to undermine the value which many aestheticians
place on our ability to provide critical reasons in sup-
port of our aesthetic judgments.
It is also important to highlight that not all
results from cognitive science which challenge ortho-
doxies within aesthetics provide license for skepti-
cism. Indeed, there are some areas where such
research might actually undermine traditional skepti-
cal worries. It is, for example, commonplace for
aestheticians to deny—following Kant (Ref 1,
p. 94)—that we can arrive at aesthetic knowledge via
any source of judgment other than ﬁrst-hand experi-
ence of the object judged. Other sources of
knowledge—such as testimony and inference—which
are generally taken to be unproblematic in other
domains are impermissible when it comes to aesthetic
matters. Further, this view is often supported by the
additional claim that we do not, as a matter of
descriptive fact, form our aesthetic judgments using
Overview wires.wiley.com/cogsci
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these other methods. It seems, though, there is good
reason to reject this descriptive claim33 and a number
of studies—such as those by Ginsburgh and Ours21
and Dixon et al.34—have shown that we frequently
do form aesthetic judgments on the basis of social
factors such as testimony.
FICTION, IMAGINATION, AND
COGNITIVE SCIENCE
To explain our ability to engage with ﬁction we need
to appeal to a cognitive capacity which allows us to
represent the world in ways different from those in
which we actually take it to be. In other words, we
need to appeal to the imagination (although for skep-
ticism about the link between ﬁction and imagina-
tion, see Matravers35). Consequently, we can draw
on cognitive scientiﬁc work on the imagination to
illuminate traditional aesthetic problems surrounding
ﬁction36 and, on the other hand, by observing our
experience of ﬁction we can learn important things
about the imagination.37,38 In this section, we focus
on three phenomena concerning our imaginative
engagement with ﬁction that are of interest to both
cognitive scientists and philosophers: ﬁctional emo-
tions, imaginative resistance, and transportation.
Fictional Emotions
The label ‘ﬁctional emotions’ refers to our affective
responses to ﬁction, such as our pity for Anna Kare-
nina when we read about her tragic fate, or our fear
of Hannibal Lecter when we watch The Silence of
the Lambs. These sorts of responses appear familiar,
appropriate, and even reasonable, but they also raise
problems: can we really feel pity or fear toward
something which we do not believe exists? And—
granted that we do feel them—can such emotions be
rational?
Traditionally, philosophers addressed these
problems—which are gathered under the rubric of
‘the paradox of ﬁction’—using conceptual analysis
and appeals to intuitions. So, for example, Walton
famously argued that genuine emotions involve both
beliefs in the existence of their objects, and some
degree of motivational force.39,40 And since our
affective responses to ﬁction seem to lack both these
features, we should recognize that—even if they are
phenomenologically indistinguishable from genuine
emotions—they are not in fact genuine, and should
rather be classiﬁed as ‘quasi-emotions.’ In recent
years, however, some philosophers have pointed out
the limits of this sort of armchair approach, arguing
that attention must be paid to relevant work in the
cognitive sciences. For instance, Gendler and Kova-
kovich41 drew on empirical research by Harris38 and
Damasio42,43 to challenge Walton’s view, arguing
that our affective responses to ﬁction closely resemble
real emotions not only with respect to phenomenol-
ogy, but also with respect to motivational force.
More recently, Cova and Teroni44 also pointed to
empirical evidence for the motivational force of affec-
tive responses to ﬁction (e.g., evidence that admiring
virtuous ﬁctional characters can motivate real-life vir-
tuous behavior45). On the other hand, though, they
also pointed to the large body of empirical research
on emotion regulation to question the extent to
which ﬁctional emotions resemble real ones phenom-
enologically.46,47 Further important insights into the
nature of ﬁctional emotions come from authors
working in the cognitive-scientiﬁc program of Simu-
lation Theory. Authors like Currie and Ravenscroft48
and Goldman49 argued that our engagement with ﬁc-
tions is underpinned by the same simulative mechan-
isms that we use to understand other people—
mechanisms which crucially involve some sort of
empathic identiﬁcation. On this view, our affective
responses to ﬁctional characters are not essentially
different from those we have toward real people.
Beyond various substantial differences, what all
these approaches have in common is an empirically
informed stance, which takes evidence from the cog-
nitive sciences to be the ultimate tribunal to adjudi-
cate disputes on the nature of our affective responses
to ﬁction.
Imaginative Resistance
The phenomenon of imaginative resistance, originally
pointed out by Hume,25 and revived by Moran50 and
Walton,51 has to do with the comparative difﬁculty
that we encounter in engaging with certain kinds of
imaginings—cases of morally deviant imaginings
being the paradigmatic example. While we do not
typically struggle to imagine scenarios that deviate
from our factual beliefs—such as a Disney scenario
where mice can talk and behave like humans—if we
are asked to imagine scenarios that depart from our
moral beliefs—such as a scenario where female infan-
ticide is a morally acceptable practice (and is not
merely believed to be so)—we are likely to experience
some signiﬁcant difﬁculties: some sort of imaginative
resistance.
Classical explanations of this sort of resistance
trace it back either to impossibility or unwillingness.
Walton51 defended the view that a scenario where
female infanticide is morally acceptable generates an
impossibility that we are unable to make sense of—
WIREs Cognitive Science Aesthetics and cognitive science
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hence unable to imagine (for a more sophisticate var-
iant of this view, see Weatherson52). Against this,
Gendler53,54 argued that our imaginative resistance
in a case of this sort is due to the fact that—even
though we are able to imagine such a moral
aberration—we don’t want to do so because we fear
that this may lead us to actually believing it. Finally,
authors like Stock55 and Todd56 have expressed
some skepticism about the very existence of imagina-
tive resistance. In their view, resistance seems to arise
with artiﬁcial philosophical examples that focus on
isolated acontextual propositions—while the same
propositions occurring in the context of a full-ﬂedged
ﬁction would not be similarly resisted.
Arguably, these different approaches to imagi-
native resistance all provide valuable insights into dif-
ferent aspects of this complex phenomenon—insights
that in recent years some philosophers have started
to assess and develop on empirical grounds. Wein-
berg and Meskin,57 for example, draw on Nichols
and Stich’s58 account of our cognitive architecture in
arguing that what generates resistance is not impossi-
bility per se, let alone unwillingness, but, rather, the
nature of our cognitive systems. More precisely,
resistance arises from a conﬂict between different sys-
tems that try to insert contrasting representations
into the so-called ‘imagination-box.’ When we are
asked to imagine, for example, that ‘female infanti-
cide is acceptable,’ an ‘input system’ will place this
representation into our imagination box. However,
our ‘moral reasoning system’ will respond to the
morally salient features of a female infanticide sce-
nario by generating an opposite representation
(‘female infanticide is unacceptable’). This conﬂict
will generate an imaginative blockage.
More recently, Liao et al.59 have turned to
empirical methods to address skeptical worries about
imaginative resistance. They designed two studies
which revealed that imaginative resistance does
indeed arise outside of philosophical debates. But
they also showed that skeptics are right in thinking
that contextual factors play a key role in this phe-
nomenon. Indeed, their results suggest that genre
competence (or lack thereof ) may play a decisive role
in explaining imaginative resistance or its absence.
For instance, reading ‘The Story of Hippolytus and
Larissa,’ subjects familiar with Greek mythology
turned out to experience less resistance to imagining
that actions of Zeus-approved trickery are morally
right, than those unfamiliar with Greek mythology.
Liao and Gendler60,61 have argued that imagi-
native resistance can be illuminated by the large body
of empirical research on the so-called phenomenon
of transportation. Psychologists use the term
‘transportation’ to refer to the experience of becom-
ing immersed in the world of a story to the extent of
having the impression of leaving the real world for a
while.62,63 This sort of experience, they say, is made
possible by the fact that many of our mental
resources—such as attention, imagination, and
emotions—become focused on the story and away
from the world. This can happen to various degrees,
with immersion shading off into mere low-level
engagement. Liao and Gendler’s idea is that imagina-
tive resistance may be seen as ‘an extreme case of not
being transported at all’ (Ref 60, p. 85); and that,
insofar as this is true, psychological work about the
factors that inﬂuence transportation can shed light
on the mechanisms that determine imaginative
resistance.
Transportation and Learning from Fiction
The idea that ﬁctions can inﬂuence our real-world
attitudes and beliefs has been discussed by philoso-
phers since ancient times. While Plato was pessimistic
about the ways in which they might do so, banning
ﬁctions from his Republic because of their suppos-
edly dangerous inﬂuences, many after him have
defended various forms of aesthetic cognitivism—
that is the view that our engagement with ﬁctions
can be a relevant source of learning—claiming that
ﬁctions can enhance our understanding of ourselves,
our world, and the moral domain.64–66
Work in cognitive and social psychology pro-
vides evidence that is relevant to assessing these
claims. Consider ﬁrst the aforementioned psychologi-
cal studies on transportation. Such studies found that
transported readers tend to change their real-world
attitudes in ways that reﬂect the views expressed,
explicitly or implicitly, by the stories they read. Strik-
ingly, while these attitudinal changes correlate with
self-reported degrees of transportation, they are inde-
pendent of whether subjects think they are reading
ﬁction or nonﬁction. Signiﬁcant degrees of transpor-
tation into a story where a young girl is stabbed to
death by a psychiatric patient, for instance, were
found to inﬂuence readers’ judgments about violence
and injustice in the real world, even when the story
was explicitly labeled as ﬁction.62 Similar inﬂuences
of ﬁctions upon our real-world attitudes were also
found in a number of other studies. For example,
Prentice and Gerrig67,68 showed that readers tend to
endorse putatively factual statements made by story-
characters. Other studies revealed the remarkable
inﬂuence of TV-dramas upon viewers’ judgments
about social reality (with, for instance, heavy TV
viewers systematically overestimating the real-world
Overview wires.wiley.com/cogsci
6 of 15 © 2017 Wiley Per iodica ls , Inc.
occurrence of such items as crime, violence, and mar-
ital discord).69 Psychologists explain these inﬂuences
of ﬁction upon us by appealing to nonrational, auto-
matic mechanisms of belief-change—such as what
Green and Brock called ‘narrative persuasion.’63 On
this view, based on Dan Gilbert’s ‘Spinozistic’
account of belief acquisition, humans automatically
believe everything they hear, while disbelieving
requires an effortful process that for various reasons
might not be activated.70 The engagement with a ﬁc-
tion can be one such reason: by absorbing all the
readers’ attention, ﬁctions lower their epistemic vigi-
lance, preventing them from activating the adequate
processes of belief rejection. Hence, as Gilbert
et al. put it: ‘they can’t not believe everything they
read’ (Ref 70, p. 221).
If readers of ﬁctions do come to change their
real-world beliefs and attitudes simply because they
lower their epistemic guard, this presents a serious
challenge to the cognitivist’s claim that ﬁctions are a
signiﬁcant source of learning. After all, this appears
to be an unreliable process of belief formation and,
hence, even true beliefs acquired this way might not
count as knowledge. Although such studies do not
force us to deny that learning from ﬁction can ever
occur, they suggest that such learning is far from
straightforward, and it may require some speciﬁc
conditions in order to be achieved. Friend71 has tried
to set out what precisely such conditions might
be. She suggested that, even if it is true that engaging
with ﬁction lowers our epistemic vigilance, making
us more prone to acquire false beliefs, competent
readers may ameliorate these effects thanks to their
extensive familiarity with the literary conventions of
different ﬁction genres, which allows them to auto-
matically discriminate truth from falsity within the
story contents. Other philosophers propose alterna-
tive accounts of the inﬂuences of ﬁction. Ichino and
Currie,72 for example, argue that at least in some
cases our getting beliefs from ﬁction may depend
upon our making assumptions about the author’s
serious communicative intentions, or else upon our
taking the story itself as a plausible model of real-
world processes.
From Cognitive Science to Aesthetics—
and Back
So far, we have emphasized the ways in which cogni-
tive scientiﬁc work concerning imagination can help
to shed light on traditional aesthetic problems sur-
rounding engagement with ﬁction. But the relation-
ship between aesthetics and cognitive science is not
just one-way. Aesthetic discussions about such
phenomena as ﬁctional emotions, imaginative resist-
ance, and learning from ﬁction have inspired cogni-
tive scientists, drawing their attention to uses and
aspects of imagination that they might otherwise
have failed to notice, and prompting them to con-
sider more critically some of their assumptions about
the imagination.
For example, the idea that the imagination can
elicit real emotions has often been uncritically
assumed by psychologists and neuroscientists, who in
their trials typically rely on acknowledgedly ﬁctional
stimuli in order to draw conclusions about subjects’
emotional reactions.73 Aesthetic discussions on the
paradox of ﬁction have highlighted the need to con-
sider this assumption more critically (see Ref
40, ch. 4).
To take another example, discussions of imagi-
native resistance have highlighted some complexities
concerning the relationships between imagination
and belief. Impossibility accounts of resistance have
challenged the commonplace idea that imagination is
an unbridled faculty, pointing out various ways in
which it may actually be constrained and inﬂuenced
by our (evaluative, and perhaps other) beliefs.
Unwillingness accounts have pointed in the opposite
direction, emphasizing the power that imagination
may have to inﬂuence our beliefs—and the limits of
so-called ‘imaginative quarantining.’
PICTURE PERCEPTION
This section largely focuses on the nature of picture
perception. Discussion of picture perception, within
both philosophy and cognitive science, has often
been linked very closely with discussion of the nature
of pictures themselves. For example, Gibson,74,75
who was one of the ﬁrst psychologists to talk about
depiction, defended a resemblance theory of pictures
and used this as a basis for his view of picture per-
ception. The basic idea is that pictures resemble that
which they represent. This is an explanation of depic-
tion which states that what makes pictures pictures
are certain features of the pictures themselves, and
not features of a speciﬁc perceptual experience (there
is a signiﬁcant body of philosophical work discussing
the idea that pictures represent objects because they
somehow resemble them76–79). This strategy ﬁts his
psychological framework, ecological psychology,
quite well. Ecological psychology states that one
directly perceives the world. Gibson rejects the cur-
rently mainstream view in psychology that perceptual
experience is a representation of the world. Instead
of representing the world in perception, Gibson
WIREs Cognitive Science Aesthetics and cognitive science
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argues, we are in direct contact with the world. Like-
wise, Gibson claims that picture perception is not a
different way of representing the world; instead, a
picture is a different thing, which we directly per-
ceive. The question about the essential features of
picture perception is, in Gibson’s framework, there-
fore reduced to the question about the essential fea-
tures of pictures.
Top-Down Perception
Art historian Gombrich’s80 views on picture percep-
tion and perception in general could be seen as the
absolute opposite of Gibson’s. Whereas Gibson
thought that picture perception is purely bottom-up,
Gombrich argued that picture perception is a pre-
dominantly top-down process. Gombrich states that
cognition is necessary to construct the meaning of
the picture. To support this point, Gombrich draws
on some psychological work including a famous
study by Bruner and Postman.81 In this study, parti-
cipants are shown different playing cards. Each card
appears very brieﬂy to the participants. When black
hearts are shown, some participants report that they
perceive these hearts as purple. An explanation is
that the expectation that hearts on playing cards are
red inﬂuences the perceptual experience. The expec-
tation makes the hearts more reddish, so one ends up
with a perceptual experience of purple hearts.
Twofoldness
Another essential feature of picture perception
according to Gombrich is that it involves a percep-
tion of the picture surface, as well as a perceptual
experience of what is depicted. This idea was
expanded by Wollheim82,83 who described picture
perception as a twofold experience. The ‘two folds’
of this perceptual experience are respectively the pic-
ture surface and the depicted scene. This view has
been defended more recently by Lopes84 and
Nanay.85–87
A difference between Gombrich and Wollheim
is that Gombrich claims that one does not see both
the surface and the depicted scene at the same time,
while Wollheim argues that one does see the two
simultaneously. Seeing the two ‘simultaneously’ can
be interpreted in two ways:
1. We consciously attend both to the depicted
object and to some properties of the picture
surface.
2. We represent both the depicted object and
some of the properties of the picture surface
(while we may or may not attend to the sur-
face; Ref 86, p. 463).
The following phenomenon, also discussed by psy-
chologists, may support the idea of
twofoldness.82,86,88–90 When one looks at a picture
from a different angle and thus sees the picture sur-
face in a different way, the depicted scene remains
unchanged. Moreover, if one looks at a picture from
an oblique angle, one does not see the depicted scene
as distorted. This phenomenon is a reason to claim
that picture perception is a twofold experience.
Wollheim’s idea of twofoldness is also a good
ﬁt with some recent ﬁndings in vision science. Mat-
then91 and Nanay86 argue that cognitive science pro-
vides a good explanation of the twofoldness of
pictorial experience. It is widely accepted that the vis-
ual system can be divided in two main streams: the
dorsal and the ventral stream. The dorsal stream is
often called—with a little oversimpliﬁcation—the
‘where pathway’ as it is related to action-guided per-
ception, whereas the ventral stream or ‘what path-
way’ is related to recognition and identiﬁcation.92
Research suggests that people with lesions in the ven-
tral stream have great difﬁculty in perceiving a
depicted scene.93,94 Whereas people with lesions in
the dorsal stream see depicted scenes in pictures, but
ﬁnd great difﬁculty in perceiving surface properties,
more speciﬁcally length and distances of lines and
shapes.95,96 Nanay86 therefore concludes that we
have good reason to believe that ventral perception is
responsible for representing the depicted scene,
whereas dorsal perception is limited to representing
the surface properties. Matthen,91 who was the ﬁrst
to posit a dorsal-ventral view of picture perception,
provides a similar scientiﬁc explanation for Woll-
heim’s theory.
Alternative Theories
Another empirically informed account of picture per-
ception is formulated by Newall.97 Newall argues
that at least some cases of picture perception can be
explained by what in vision science is called transpar-
ency perception. Metelli98 deﬁnes this phenomenon
as the perception of both the surface behind a trans-
parent medium and the medium itself. Transparency
perception is according to Metelli governed by the
so-called ‘laws of scission,’ which state that in trans-
parency perception the perceived properties are sepa-
rated into two sets of scission properties. When one
for instance sees a particular color through a colored
lens, this color stimulus is split into two scission col-
ors: one scission color property is attributed to the
Overview wires.wiley.com/cogsci
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transparent medium and the other scission color
property to the object one sees through the transpar-
ent surface. Newall argues that the same thing hap-
pens when one sees a depicted scene in a picture
surface. The surface of the picture ﬁgures as a trans-
parent medium and the perceived properties when
looking at a picture are separated into two sets of
scission properties.
In cognitive science of vision, interesting
research on picture perception has been done inde-
pendently from philosophy. For example, Marr, a
pioneer in cognitive vision science, claimed that pic-
ture perception initially involves the detection of
boundaries on the picture surface.99 This information
is processed, resulting in the ability to recognize the
shapes of the depicted objects. For an overview of
more recent research on this topic see Goldstein.100
This section has discussed some of the most
important interactions between philosophy and cog-
nitive science when it comes to picture perception.
For further discussion of these, and other, topics see
Kulvicki101 and Seeley.102
EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHICAL
AESTHETICS
Rather than simply mining the results of the cognitive
sciences, some philosophers have begun to do experi-
mental cognitive science themselves—using its meth-
ods to investigate questions of philosophical
concern.103,104 This branch of philosophical inquiry
has come to be known as ‘Experimental Philosophy.’
Inspired by philosophers’ common practice of
appealing to what is intuitive, early work in the
experimental philosophy movement relied on ques-
tionnaire methods and focused on exploring folk
intuitions about common philosophical cases.105,106
But contemporary experimental philosophy also uses
a wide range of nonquestionnaire methods and
explores a variety of aspects of human psychology
and behavior.107 Experimental philosophical aesthet-
ics is the sub-branch of experimental philosophy that
deals with issue of concern to aestheticians.108
Objectivity and Value
Is beauty really in the eye of the beholder, or is there
some sort of objective standard for beauty and taste?
Questions about the nature of beauty, taste, and aes-
thetic value have been central to aesthetics since its
birth.1,25 In recent years, some philosophers have
attempted to gain insight into these matters through
empirical methods.
It is sometimes argued that folk aesthetics is
realist in nature and that this supports aesthetic
realism—very roughly, the view that at least some
aesthetic judgments are true or false and that their
truth value is independent of individual preferences.
In a series of studies, Cova and Pain109 sought to
undercut this argument for aesthetic realism by
showing that ordinary folk are not what they call
‘normativists’ about the aesthetic domain. That is,
ordinary folk do not seem to think that when two
people contradict each other on an aesthetic matter
one must be right and the other wrong. Since Cova
and Pain hold that realism implies normativism, they
take the rejection of normativism by the folk to sug-
gest that ordinary aesthetic thought is not realist.
Hence, these results are taken to undercut one posi-
tive argument for aesthetic realism.
Another challenge to aesthetic realism comes
out of Cutting’s work on mere exposure. As men-
tioned above, Cutting suggested that the mechanism
of mere exposure might be a signiﬁcant factor in the
maintenance and formation of artistic canons as well
as the formation of aesthetic judgments (Ref 19,
p. 335). But if canon formation and aesthetic judg-
ment are explained largely by the mere exposure
mechanism, then there may be no need to explain
them by appeal to mind-independent aesthetic values,
and a signiﬁcant argument for aesthetic realism is
undercut. In fact, Cutting’s own remarks about judg-
ments of aesthetic quality are decidedly skeptical
(ibid.). Meskin et al.110 investigated Cutting’s skepti-
cal suggestions via a study which explored the effect
of mere exposure to works by Thomas Kinkade, the
American ‘Painter of Light’ whose output been
described as ‘a kitsch crime against aesthetics.’111
Intriguingly, Meskin and collaborators found that
increased exposure to Kinkade’s works resulted in
decreased liking for them. Although the explanation
for the effect is not clear, the researchers conclude
that even though mere exposure may play some role
in canon maintenance and aesthetic judgment, some-
thing more (perhaps quality or value) appears to be
involved.
Language and Communication
Traditional aesthetic debates tend to focus on phe-
nomena related to private aesthetic reception; that is,
on individual responses to artworks and other aes-
thetic phenomena. But human engagement with art
and beauty is a profoundly social phenomenon: we
regularly communicate about aesthetic matters—cri-
ticizing, reviewing, describing, interpreting, and
advising. Although it is often said that there is no
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disputing taste, we appear to dispute matters of taste
all the time.
Aesthetic communication and disputation often
rely on the use of aesthetic adjectives. Liao and
Meskin112 have adapted psycholinguistic methods
from Syrett et al.113,114 to explore aspects of various
aesthetic adjectives such as ‘beautiful,’ ‘ugly,’ and
‘elegant.’ These adjectives are clear examples of what
are commonly called ‘gradable adjectives’: adjectives
such as ‘tall’ and ‘short’ which admit of comparative
constructions (e.g., ‘Jane is taller than John’). On one
well-known account,115 there are two distinct kinds
of gradable adjectives: relative gradable adjectives,
such as ‘tall’ and ‘fat’, which are context-sensitive,
and absolute gradable adjectives, such as ‘full’ and
‘ﬂat’, which are not used in a context-sensitive man-
ner. In a series of online experiments, Liao and
Meskin showed that aesthetic adjectives behave nei-
ther like relative adjectives nor like absolute
adjectives:subjects seemed to be divided as to
whether to treat them as context-sensitive or not.
Liao and Meskin go on to argue that these results,
which suggest a signiﬁcant amount of interpersonal
variation with respect to a subtle feature of the usage
of aesthetic language, may provide some insight into
the difﬁculties that are often said to infect aesthetic
communication. In a follow-up paper, Liao,
McNally, and Meskin116 report on the results of a
new experimental method for exploring gradable
adjectives, the question felicity test. On this test,
where subjects are asked about whether it makes
sense to ask of various objects whether various predi-
cates apply (e.g., ‘Is this long?,’ ‘Is this beautiful?,’ ‘Is
this spotted?’), subjects treated aesthetic adjectives
like absolute adjectives. Corpus research also sup-
ports the claim that aesthetic adjectives behave like
absolute adjectives, but other semantic tests suggest
they behave like relative ones.
In more recent work, Meskin, Liao, and
Andow117 have tackled the alleged difﬁculty with aes-
thetic communication more directly. As discussed
above, although it is a philosophical commonplace
that we regularly come to know all sorts of things on
the basis of others’ testimony, there is a long tradition
of skepticism about the possibility of gaining aesthetic
knowledge via testimony. And it has sometimes been
noted that those who are skeptical about knowledge
via aesthetic testimony have a tendency to treat their
view as a bit of common sense.118,119 In a series of
experimental studies, Meskin, Liao, and Andow117
set out to explore folk attitudes toward aesthetic testi-
mony. Their results suggest that although aesthetic
testimony is treated as less epistemically valuable than
ordinary nonaesthetic testimony, it is not treated as
epistemically valueless. Subsequent studies by
Andow120 suggest that much of the folk skepticism
directed toward aesthetic testimony is based on a
widespread belief in the prevalence of disagreement
and deception when it comes to aesthetic matters.
Deﬁnitions and Concepts
As discussed above, debates about the deﬁnition of
art have been central to aesthetics in the contempo-
rary era. Liao, Meskin, and Knobe121 have aimed to
contribute to the debate about the deﬁnition of art
by investigating the structure of the concept ART as
well as subconcepts such as LITERATURE, RAP,
PUNK, and COMIC. Dual character concepts are
concepts which combine a descriptive element (i.e., a
set of descriptive criteria) with an evaluative element
(understood in terms of abstract values or aims)
which underwrites the former.122 So, for example,
the concept PHILOSOPHER seems to combine both
descriptive criteria (e.g., having a PhD in philosophy,
working in a philosophy department, publishing phi-
losophy papers) and a more abstract normative ele-
ment (e.g., having a commitment to the pursuit of
wisdom). And something very similar is true with
respect to various other concepts such as SCIENTIST
and FRIEND. Studies by Liao, Knobe, and Meskin
suggest that ART and many other artistic concepts
(e.g., LITERATURE, PUNK, STREET ART) are dual
character in nature. So, for example, subjects tend to
think that it makes sense, when involved in a dispute
about the application of one of these concepts, to
refer to values. This is a standard feature of dual
character concepts, but is not a feature of ordinary
artifact concepts. It might be thought that this sug-
gests that these concepts simply involve positive eval-
uation, like HERO and MASTERPIECE, but Liao,
Knobe, and Meskin also report a study which sug-
gests that this is not the case. They further suggest
that these results may shed light on the nature and
persistence of ﬁrst-order disputes about whether or
not some object is a work of art (or work of litera-
ture) as well as second-order philosophical disputes
as to what drives those ﬁrst-order disagreements.
Intriguingly, they also found that a number of art
concepts such as ARCHITECTURE, SHORT
STORY, BREAKDANCING, and SONNET do not
appear to be dual-character in nature.
CONCLUSION
In this essay, we have touched on just a few of the
liveliest areas of interaction between philosophical
aesthetics and cognitive science. There are many
Overview wires.wiley.com/cogsci
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other such areas. So, for example, philosophical
work on creativity has come to be heavily inﬂuenced
by work in psychology and computer science.123,124
It is plausible that this is largely due to the inﬂuence
of the groundbreaking interdisciplinary work on cre-
ativity by philosopher Maggie Boden who is research
professor of cognitive science at the University of
Sussex.125 Another prominent area of overlap con-
cerns evolutionary theory, especially evolutionary
psychology, which has inﬂuenced a range of philoso-
phers thinking about issues such as the nature and
development of art, and aesthetic experi-
ence.13,14,126,127 Issues relating to our emotional
responses to the arts have also proven a particularly
fruitful area of interdisciplinary research—there has,
for example, been important work on disgust and
aesthetics in the last few years.128,129 In fact, philoso-
phies of art have bequeathed cognitive scientists vari-
ous problems related to the emotions, most notably
the so-called ‘paradox of tragedy’ which aims to
make sense of the pleasure audience members take in
works of art which trafﬁc in unpleasant emotions
such as sadness and pity130 and the related ‘paradox
of horror’ which focuses on our delight in artistic
representations of the terrifying and loathsome.131
(For a discussion of relevant psychological research
on the enjoyment of frightening or violent media, see
Hoffner and Levine.132) More narrowly, many phi-
losopher working on issues in the individual arts
have utilized the resources of cognitive science to
help answer philosophical questions about those par-
ticular art forms. For example, the signiﬁcance of
ﬁndings about mirror neurons for the philosophy of
dance has been hotly debated,133,134 and there is a
growing body of work at the intersection of the phi-
losophy of music and cognitive science on such topics
as musical understanding and musical emotions.135
For more work at the intersection of philosophical
aesthetics and cognitive science, see Shimamura and
Palmer,136 Goldie and Schellekens,137 Currie
et al.,138 and Currie et al.139 For another overview of
cognitive science and aesthetics, see Stokes.140
The preceding has shown that the relationship
between contemporary aesthetics and cognitive sci-
ence is a fruitful one. Not only are aestheticians tak-
ing on board the results of the cognitive sciences,
they are making substantive contributions to the cog-
nitive science themselves—both by cataloging intri-
guing aesthetic phenomena and by doing their own
experimental research.
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